Save your Golden Dome

This could have been a Zoom call.

If you missed the Golden Dome conference in Alabama, you didn't miss much. Here is everything you didn't really miss.

GDID Summary:

🎯 Mission & mandate. Leadership framed Golden Dome for America as a presidentially‑directed push to field homeland missile‑defense capabilities “at speed,” emphasizing a real, global, multi‑vector threat and a need to partner widely beyond traditional primes.

🧱 Five‑layer architecture (what they’re building). Space layer (warning/sensing/defense) ➝ Upper layer (ICBM‑class expansion), Under layer (ballistic + hypersonic in atmosphere), Limited‑Area Defense (cruise & air‑breathing threats), and a Domain Awareness/C2 layer that stitches it all together.

🛰️ Space‑Based Interceptors (SBI) are back—operationally minded. Space Force and MDA are standing up an integrated program office; they want a demonstration‑first, cost‑disciplined approach that exploits cheaper launch/proliferation trends. SBI is one layer in the stack, with a common ground/fire‑control backbone and an eye toward both boost and early post‑boost shots.

🧭 Domain Awareness = the keystone. They want a common operating picture across strategic/operational/tactical echelons; coordinated offense/defense/cyber; a low‑latency data mesh to cue “any sensor → best shooter,” and dynamic plans that manage by exception (kill/no‑kill, re‑engage). CTBMC is today’s core, but they need more automation, fusion, and speed.

🧩 Joint, integrated fire control—already prototyping. Goal: a joint network where any shooter can fire off any sensor. They cited a Patriot shot using Marine G/ATOR tracks as an early exemplar and mentioned a “Joint Track Management Capability” bridge.

🛡️ Upper layer—expand & harden. Upgrade terrestrial long‑range radars (UEWRs, LRDR), deploy NGI at scale with potential CONUS sites, and add a Southeast Radar and transportable theater‑ground radars. RFIs are out to industry.

🏃 Under layer—flexible, mobile, and automated. Aim is wide‑area defense against low‑trajectory ballistic and hypersonic threats, tightly integrated with the upper layer (deconflicted fires). They issued an RFI for a common launcher, want virtualized capability and minimal manning to enable rapid placement/relocation.

🪖 Limited‑Area Defense (Army MCP concept). Scalable “Minimum Capability Package” = IBCS EOC + LTAMDS + Sentinel A4 + ALPS + Patriot + IFPC, linked via integrated fire control for 360° defense; number of MCPs scales to the city/terrain. Strong emphasis on counter‑sUAS for self‑protection.

🤖 Remotely‑operated & AI‑enabled fire control (Army tech asks). Push more ops from radars to the EOC; containerized, low‑signature units; automated emplacement/reload; resilient multi‑path comms; UPS‑like power failover; net‑centric init/patching; status/maintenance “as a service.” For AI: train CCTDI models, optimize shot doctrine & BDA in real time, and keep humans on final calls in ambiguous civil‑mil airspace.

🧪 Test at pace = cultural shift. Testing becomes the center of gravity: agile, affordable, efficient. Drive analysis latency from months → minutes via instrumentation & digital tools; pursue monthly flight tests (at least quarterly subsystem), plus big multi‑threat capstones. Example of new risk posture: Dec 10, 2024 Guam event (C‑17‑dropped target, SM‑3 IIA intercept) was pulled left by risk‑accepting planning.

⏱️ Cadence & affordability levers. More affordable targets (orders‑of‑magnitude cheaper), integrated test baselines with other Services, and lab virtualization to pull learning left.

🧮 Fire‑control doctrine & load management. Centralized control / decentralized execution—and layered thinning so terminal defenses aren’t saturated. The network must report kill/no‑kill fast to prevent wasteful over‑engagement.

📡 C2 vertical & horizontal integration. Connect missile defense, air defense, and space at strategic/operational/tactical levels; push the right data (not all the data) to prevent network collapse.

🧾 Acquisition pathway (new umbrella). MDA previewed a “Multiple Authority Announcement” rebranded as NOBLE — Nimble Options for Noble Effects: a standing vehicle (through 2030) spanning BAAs, CSOs, OTAs, procurement‑for‑experimentation, grants, and CRADAs (now explicitly authorized for MDA) to chase disruptive tech across 8 focus areas. Expect solicitations via SAM.gov and an “Engage Partner With Us” portal.

🔐 Cyber & resilience baked in. Assume the system itself is under attack; secure the C2/data mesh; design for graceful degradation and rapid reconstitution; status telemetry must drive predictive maintenance.

🔗 So what for industry. Bring automation, AI/ML, secure comms/power, data‑fabric tech, fast instrumentation, affordable targets, and open architectures—and be ready to move fast under non‑traditional contracting.

🚀 Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Mentions

No dedicated SDA brief.
The event did not carve out a separate block explicitly labeled “Space Domain Awareness.” It was not described in the same way the other layers (Upper, Under, Limited-Area, Domain Awareness) were.

Indirect tie-ins:

The space layer of the five-layer architecture was described in terms of space-based interceptors (SBI), sensing, and warning — but the conversation stayed tactical (missile tracking, boost/post-boost intercept windows) rather than broad SDA (tracking debris, monitoring non-missile objects, characterizing adversary space behavior).

The Domain Awareness section discussed “any sensor → best shooter,” integrated C2, and a common operating picture. That naturally includes space sensors, but the transcript keeps the scope to missile defense mission sets, not full-spectrum SDA.

SBI integration implied use of space-based sensors and ground fusion nodes that could serve SDA purposes, but no one said “space domain awareness” or described the broader SSA/SDA enterprise (e.g., 18th Space Defense Squadron, cislunar tracking, debris catalogs).

Closest language to SDA:

References to global sensing and overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) for missile warning, as well as integration of space-based interceptors into the layered defense.

Need for a low-latency data mesh to fuse sensor data from “space, air, land, and sea” into actionable fire-control quality tracks.

Emphasis on resilient space-based capability to “see the threat sooner” and “reduce decision time,” which overlaps with SDA in a missile-defense context.

🧐 Analyst Bottom Line

SDA was implied but not a focal point.
They clearly depend on space-based sensors for the missile defense mission, but they did not address the broader SDA mission (tracking all space objects, space traffic management, counterspace threat monitoring).

In this event, “space” = sensor layer + interceptor layer inside the missile defense architecture — not the full SDA enterprise you’d hear from Space Command or USSF Delta 2.

Rewind and Reconnoiter: When Will Guam Become a Priority? - War on the Rocks

In 2021, Rear Adm. (ret.) Mark Montgomery wrote “Fully Fund the Guam Defense System,” where he argued that the U.S. government was failing to prioritize

War on the RocksMark Montgomery